Regulations which require mandated service to customers typically close one way of adjustment in one particular place for a limited time. I call each adjustment a margin and study how firms use the margins that remain open. I use evidence from California's one-year moratorium on non-renewals of homeowners insurance after declared wildfires. In my simple model, an insurer must maintain costly capital against the total risk of its policies and cannot change prices quickly. This links its decisions to enter or leave different markets. Whether serving one market makes another more or less attractive depends on the insurer's additional holdings. Using data on every insurer in every ZIP code, I show three things. First, insurers absorbed the moratorium on the entry margin. They became less likely to enter protected ZIP codes while protection lasted, and they did not shift their exit to other markets. Within an insurer, markets near protected ZIP codes saw less exit and more entry. This is consistent with shared regional costs. Second, most measured insurer exit was a reorganization within insurance groups. Insurers with larger shares of their book in protected ZIP codes appear to leave unrelated markets more often. I find this pattern derives from companies moving their business to affiliates. Third, insurer-initiated non-renewals fell by 30 percent while the moratorium was active, and insurers issued part of the deferred non-renewals once it expired, which I call harvesting.
Examines the spatial distribution of environmental exposure from golf course pesticide use and its relationship to community socioeconomic characteristics. Golf courses are local amenities, but they can also be a source of chemical exposure for surrounding neighborhoods.